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A Wake for Counterinsurgency?

Abandoning Counterinsurgency:
Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy
Steven Metz
ABSTRACT: This article introduces the value of efficiency
in counterterrorism, such as that applied in Israel’s effective
national defense strategy, to resolve the conundrum of eliminating
global terrorism.

O

ver the past fifty years the US military’s interest in counterinsurgency has ebbed and flowed, reflecting broader shifts in
American grand strategy and the global security environment.1
The first US “counterinsurgency era” began in the early 1960s when
policymakers recognized the Soviet Union and China were inspiring or
directly supporting left-leaning insurgencies to weaken the West, and to
do so with less risk than direct military confrontation.2
Southeast Asia soon became the primary laboratory. After the United
States withdrew from Vietnam, the military purged its counterinsurgency
knowledge and capability only to rebuild it partly in the 1980s when
Soviet backed insurgent movements were rising again, most importantly
in El Salvador.3 By the 1990s, the United States again abandoned
counterinsurgency, assuming it was a legacy of the Cold War that would
fade to irrelevance with the demise of the Soviet Union.4 Insurgencies
lingered in the Americas, Africa, and Asia; but without sponsors, most
seemed irrelevant to Washington.5 When the United States military was
deployed to the Balkans, peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency
became the central component of what was then known as “low intensity
conflict” and later “military operations other than war.”
When the September 11 attacks on the United States and President
George W. Bush’s subsequent Global War on Terrorism led to US
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency came roaring

1      For a succinct explanation, see Paul B. Rich, “A Historical Overview of US Counter-Insurgency
Policy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 1 (2014): 5–40.
2       See Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the
Present (New York: Free Press, 1977).
3      See Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations
of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991); Max
G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War—An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979
Insurrection to the Present (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998); and Andrew J.
Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (Washington: PergamonBrassey’s, 1988).
4       For detail, see Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995).
5      One of the rare exceptions was the communist insurgency in Colombia, but US concern was
more about the insurgents’ involvement in narcotrafficking than their dilapidated ideology.
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back, beginning what David Ucko called a “new counterinsurgency era.”6
But this iteration was different. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were initially
intended to be short stabilization operations following the removal
of hostile regimes. They only evolved into counterinsurgency when
opponents of the new, American-backed governments adopted the
techniques of Cold War insurgents.7
From 2003 onward, the US military rediscovered, updated, and
applied Cold War-era counterinsurgency concepts, turned them into
updated Service and Joint doctrine, and developed organizations
and capabilities to implement the new doctrine.8 This approach took
extensive effort since the Army’s inclination after Vietnam was to resist
involvement in counterinsurgency.9 Partly because of this resistance,
the revival of counterinsurgency took several years. Even so, it was the
fastest such adaptation of a conventional force in history.10
During this process, though, the United States never seriously debated
whether Cold War-style counterinsurgency made strategic sense in Iraq
and Afghanistan—whether it was a universal approach or a time- and
situation-specific one. Because extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan were
doing things that looked like twentieth-century insurgency, American
strategists simply dusted off Cold War counterinsurgency and revised
it.11 This worked in Iraq to an extent. After several years of bloody and
expensive fighting, the insurgency was battered to the point the Iraqi
government could have finished it off by institutionalizing political and
economic reform and continuing to professionalize its security forces.12
That the Iraqi government failed to do so hints at deep flaws in the
American approach to counterinsurgency.
The US campaign in Afghanistan was less successful. The conflict
there was a lower priority than that in Iraq, so stabilization and
6     David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). On the integration of counterinsurgency
into the Global War on Terror, see Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror:
Military Culture and Irregular War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
7     On the initial coalescence of the Iraq insurgency, see Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Hashim, “Insurgency in
Iraq 2003–10,” in The Routledge Handbook to Insurgency and Counter Insurgency, ed. Paul B. Rich and
Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2012). On the Afghan insurgency, see Antonio Giustozzi,
“Insurgency in Afghanistan,” in Rich and Duyvesteyn, Routledge Companion; and Giustozzi, Koran,
Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007).
8     Unlike the period between Vietnam and the 1980s, or from the early 1990s to 2005, Joint
and service counterinsurgency doctrine continues to be updated on a regular schedule. While
new revisions will be published soon, the current versions are US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013); and Headquarters, US
Department of the Army (HQDA), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).
9     See Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).
10     See Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War (Washington
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). Other government agencies revived their counterinsurgency concepts as well. See US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Guide to the Analysis of
Insurgency (Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence Agency, 2009); and US Government Interagency
Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs).
11     Daniel Marston, “Lessons in 21st Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001–2007,”
in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey,
2008); and Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May 2003-January 2007,” in Marston and
Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare.
12     See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle For
Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon, 2012).
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reconstruction programs were underresourced. Afghanistan had a much
weaker national identity and professional class than Iraq, making the
job of supporting counterinsurgency more difficult. And the Afghan
insurgents had two of the things a successful insurgency needs: a
lucrative funding source (opium) and an external sanctuary the United
States has been unable to shut down (Pakistan).13
Today, US involvement in Afghanistan is at a much lower level than
a few years ago. But, there is no sign Kabul will be able to contain, much
less defeat, the insurgents any time soon. Even so, American political
leaders continue to bet on counterinsurgency, apparently believing if
the precise US troop levels and missions are found, it eventually will
work. In reality it will not, mostly because there is a much bigger issue
at play: Afghanistan demonstrates the American conceptualization
of counterinsurgency, born in the Cold War and resuscitated without
a fundamental revision after the September 11 attacks, has reached
the end of its lifespan.14 The Army, the Joint Force, and the rest of
the US government now must do what it failed to do after September
11 and seriously examine the assumptions, conceptual foundations,
and strategic effectiveness of counterinsurgency. This analysis will
demonstrate counterinsurgency is unacceptably inefficient and should
be abandoned in favor of a new method of antiterrorism that better
reflects the domestic political situation and the dynamics of the twentyfirst-century global security environment.

How We Got Here

While the United States has a long tradition of small wars against
irregular opponents and implemented a form of counterinsurgency in
the Philippines between 1899 and 1902, counterinsurgency did not
become central to American grand strategy until the 1960s.15 Worried
by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s January 1961 speech endorsing
“wars of national liberation,” the eroding security situation in Laos
and South Vietnam, the consolidation of Fidel Castro’s regime in
Cuba, the French defeat in Algeria, and the outbreak of communist
insurgencies in Colombia and Venezuela, President John Kennedy
concluded the Soviets were undertaking indirect aggression against the
West using leftist insurgencies. This decision made counterinsurgency
strategically significant.
13      While the “surge” is often credited with breaking the Iraq insurgency (e.g. Kimberly Kagan,
The Surge: A Military History [New York: Encounter, 2009]), it actually took a combination of factors
including some success constricting Syria’s and Iran’s support for the insurgency, the growing
effectiveness of US special operations efforts, and significant improvement in the Iraqi security forces.
Steven Metz, Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2010). On the special operations campaign, see Sean Naylor, Relentless Strike: The
Secret History of the Joint Special Operations Command (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015); Mark Urban, Task
Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq (New York: St Martin’s, 2012);
and Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio, 2013).
14      For an elaboration of this argument, see Gian P. Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace
of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013), 113–35
15      David E. Johnson, “You Go to COIN with the Military You Have: The United States and
250 Years of Irregular War,” in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures,
ed. Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). On how
the Philippines affected US thinking about counterinsurgency, see Brian McAllister Linn, The
Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). For the closest thing to
American counterinsurgency doctrine before the Cold War, see US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940).
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The rationale for US involvement in counterinsurgency grew
from the “domino theory” and the “death by a thousand small cuts”
notion popular among French strategic theorists.16 Revolutionary war,
this group believed, had become the dominant form of conflict in the
late twentieth-century. Defeats for pro-Western nations, even in places
appearing unimportant, could aggregate into global Soviet victory. With
a military stalemate in Europe and communist expansion checked in
Korea, the Cold War had devolved to a series of Third World skirmishes.
The strategic significance of insurgency was symbolic and perceptual as
an indicator of historic trends.
To respond, Kennedy ordered a wide-ranging expansion of
US counterinsurgency capabilities. He first formed a cabinet level
Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal Defense Policy
to develop a unified counterinsurgency strategy and coordinate
efforts across the government.17 The Pentagon created an Office on
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities headed by Major General
Victor H. Krulak (US Marine Corps), giving him direct access to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.18 The military
services integrated counterinsurgency into their professional educational
systems and established training centers for it. Army Special Forces were
expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency assistance.19 Even
the State Department and the Agency for International Development
began to take counterinsurgency seriously, albeit with less enthusiasm
than the military.20
From its inception, though, US thinking about counterinsurgency
had a heterogeneous intellectual foundation. One important element
was the French notion of guerre révolutionnaire, which viewed insurgency
as East-West proxy conflict. A second element was the belief that
counterinsurgency required holistic stabilization and political reform
rather than simply battlefield victory and thus needed a tightly integrated
military, political, informational, economic, intelligence, and law
enforcement effort. This idea came from British pacification campaigns
in Malaya, Kenya, and elsewhere, as well as from French officers who
fought insurgents in Indochina and Algeria.21
The third component of American counterinsurgency was the theory
of modernization borrowed from academia.22 Derived in part from the
16      Peter Paret, “The French Army and La Guerre Révolutionnaire,” Survival 1, no. 1 (1959):
25–32, doi:10.1080/00396335908440119; and Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to
Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Praeger, 1964).
17      Charles Maechling Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in Low Intensity Warfare:
Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh
(New York: Pantheon, 1988), 26–27.
18      Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: William Morrow,
1994), 736
19      Army Special Forces were created to undertake unconventional warfare behind Soviet lines
during a major conflict in Europe.
20      U. Alexis Johnson, “Internal Defense and the Foreign Service,” Foreign Service Journal 39, no.
7 (July 1962): 21–22; and Henry C. Ramsey, “The Modernization Process and Insurgency,” Foreign
Service Journal 39, no. 6 (June 1962): 21–23.
21      Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1978); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New
York: Praeger, 1964); and David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York:
Praeger, 1964.)
22      M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency:
Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 58–68.
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writings of German sociologist Max Weber, modernization theory was
based on the idea that the natural path for developing societies was from
traditional economic, political, and social organizations to “modern”
ones relying on bureaucratic administration with professional credentials
and expertise rather than familial or traditional authorities.
As Americans grappled with insurgency, modernization theory
provided an overarching intellectual framework. Policymakers and
strategists concluded the difficult and complex transition from
traditional to “modern” societies and political systems created tensions
and conflicts. Modernization saw the political awakening of previously
passive segments of society, such as the rural peasantry and marginalized
ethnic, sectarian, or racial groups. Often traditional structures of order
decayed more rapidly than modern ones developed.23 All these factors
provided opportunities for revolutionary movements. If revolutionaries
could not seize power through a Bolshevik-style putsch, one alternative
was a protracted, rural insurgency based on an extensive political
underground, information warfare and propaganda, terrorism, and
guerrilla operations.
Modernization theory told American counterinsurgents that success
was not simply defeating insurgent units but expanding the state’s
capacity to govern and secure its territory—in other words to do the
things modernization theory says “modern” states should do. Until a
nation became modern, it could not use political institutions to reconcile
divergences among its population or have its security forces prevent
or defeat organized insurgency. Thus, counterinsurgency required
nation-building.
From the beginning, this kludge of very different ideas had internal
tensions. Conceptualizing insurgency as a form of war suggested it
should be military-centric, but if battlefield victory did not equate to
strategic success, the military could only do half the job—and, it was
the easier half. Of course in conventional war, the peace settlement
determines whether battlefield success led to strategic victory, but in
counterinsurgency, what came after battlefield success was even more
difficult to determine.
That conclusion was not the only fissure in the concept. When the
British and French undertook counterinsurgency while decolonizing,
they assumed the authority of the nation where the conflict occurred.
They could impose deep political and economic reforms even if
traditional elites opposed it. Yet things were different for the United
States: it did not undertake counterinsurgency but counterinsurgency
support working through a local partner government. That divergence
means the British and French models, which were part of the intellectual
foundation of American counterinsurgency, were not fully applicable.
Neither those models nor academic modernization theory explains how
to compel a resistant local ally to undertake deep reform. In fact, as the
United States helped a partner nation expand its political, military, law
enforcement, and intelligence capability, Washington’s ability to compel
change declined. The United States never surmounted this leverage dilemma
23      For the most influential analysis of this phenomenon, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
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in Vietnam or later in Iraq or Afghanistan. Current counterinsurgency
doctrine recognizes this problem but offers no solution.24
Combining academic modernization theory with British and French
notions of counterinsurgency also created organizational problems. The
military dominated America’s counterinsurgency organization even
though the ultimate solution to insurgency was nonmilitary. Despite
creating large embassies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, either the US
military remained the most important player (Vietnam, Afghanistan) or
the embassy found when most of the US military left and the insurgency
was under control, it could not convince the partner government to
finalize success by continuing deep reform (Iraq).

The Decay of Old Concepts

As American counterinsurgency was revived in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the problematic assumptions and internal tensions
inherent to the concept festered and worsened, becoming less tolerable
as the strategic significance of insurgency declined. For instance, the
architects of post-September 11 counterinsurgency accepted the idea
that it is a type of war; the phrase “counterinsurgency warfare” was
common. While insurgents do use armed action, war is not entirely
military but rather military-centric.25 Insurgency, by contrast, is designed
to diminish the importance of the military realm, primarily because the
state—especially a state that has external counterinsurgency support—
is normally militarily dominant, at least at the very end.
In some ways, insurgency is more akin to premodern fighting where
the primary objective was to demonstrate the bravery of individual
warriors or capture prisoners for ritual sacrifice or slavery than to
impose the political will of one group on another. This means calling
counterinsurgency “war” is using the word euphemistically like the
“war on poverty” or “war on drugs.” This allegory makes sustaining
public support difficult since Americans expect their nation eventually
to “win” in some demonstrable way. Approaching counterinsurgency as
war skews both its organization and its expectations.
The traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency assumed
partner governments supported the Western-Weberian notion of
modernization and were willing to undertake deep reforms to become
“modern.” All they needed was a boost. Counterinsurgency had “an
ideological dimension imbued with a distinctively American liberal
philosophical and political self-understanding.”26 From this perspective,
all the United States needed to do was provide partner governments the
means to modernize.

24      See, for instance, JCS, Counterinsurgency, VIII-8.
25      Some scholars treat nonviolent strategic social movements as a type of insurgency. See,
for instance, Mark Grimsley, “Why the Civil Rights Movement Was an Insurgency,” HistoryNet,
February 24, 2010, http://www.historynet.com/why-the-civil-rights-movement-was-an-insurgency
.htm. I disagree and consider insurgency a type of strategy, which by definition includes armed force,
whether semiconventional military operations, guerrilla operations, terrorism, or most often, a blend
of them. Insurgency is not military centric but always entails violence. Steven Metz, “Rethinking
Insurgency,” in Rich and Duyvesteyn, Routledge Handbook; and Metz, “Insurgency,” in Conceptualising
Modern War, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (London: Hurst, 2011).
26      Smith and Jones, Political Impossibility, 57.

A Wake for Counterinsurgency?

Metz

19

This assumption proved accurate in some places like El Salvador,
Colombia, and the Philippines. To the architects of American
counterinsurgency, that success validated the principle, leading them
to draw universal conclusions from culture- and situation-specific
circumstances. Yet in many parts of the world—including those most
prone to insurgency—the state is not a detached reconciler using a rule
set that does not favor any one segment of the society. The body politic is
not designed to balance diverse interests but to formalize and to sustain
the group holding power. Because this motive produces resistance,
Americans encouraged the local elite to transform the political, legal,
and economic systems into something reflecting the Western notion of
fairness or, as it is often phrased, good governance. But, such entreaties
ask elites to alter a system that benefits them, their families, and
their peers.
In other words, the American approach to counterinsurgency is
contingent on partner elites acting irrationally—doing things against
the interests of themselves, their families, and their affiliates. As Joint
counterinsurgency doctrine notes, “US counterinsurgents will often
have to cajole or coerce [host nation] governments and entrenched
elites to recognize the legitimacy of those grievances and address them.
This is especially true where reforms would involve compromising the
political and financial interests of those elites.”27 While accurate, these
elites generally undertake just enough reform to satisfy Washington,
which keeps assistance flowing without fundamentally altering the
beneficial system.
Thus another flaw with the traditional conceptualization of
counterinsurgency appears: the United States seeks the complete
defeat of the insurgents while its local partners often benefit from the
persistence of an insurgency large enough to sustain American interest
and assistance but not powerful enough to overthrow them. Insurgency
keeps aid flowing and gives the political elite an excuse for repression,
exclusion, and holding onto power.28 Imagine, for instance, Afghanistan
with the Taliban defeated: with little interest from the world, the country
would sink back into even more crushing poverty. Without a stream of
external assistance, Afghanistan’s professional class and political elite
would have far fewer economic opportunities. In long running conflicts,
a “war economy” usually emerges, which benefits both the elites that
the United States supports and the insurgent leaders.29 Ultimately, this
rapport means those with the power to end an insurgency—whether
local elites or counterinsurgent leaders—often have little incentive to
do so; while those who suffer the most from the conflict—the local
population—do not have the power to end it.
While US doctrine recognizes the problem, the United States has
never found a way to resolve it.30 To gain the support of the American
public, US political leaders must portray a conflict as one where
supporting the local elite is an important, even vital American interest.
27      JCS, Counterinsurgency, II-19.
28      Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 330–31.
29      See, for instance, Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, The Political Economy of Civil War and
Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005).
30      JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-3.
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This commitment, combined with the fact that many insurgency
movements are, in fact, worse than America’s partners, diminishes US
leverage over its partner elite. Thus, the United States is unable to compel
its partners to undertake the degree of system change that might prevent
future armed resistance but which erodes their own power and wealth.
The United States also is hindered by the idea that the “normal” state
of affairs is for a state to exercise control over all of its national territory.
In many parts of the world—including those prone to insurgency—this
is not the norm. While governments would be happy to do so, they
draw the very rational conclusion that the benefits of exercising full
control over their national territory is not worth the costs. Thus, they
focus on the areas where the elite and its affiliates live, whether regions
or parts of cities, and on the wealth-producing parts of the nation such
as economically robust urban areas, regions with important natural
resources, and transportation corridors. They write off rural hinterlands
dominated by nonelite groups, regions that do not generate wealth,
and increasingly, poorer urban areas. Elites accept these areas are
informally governed, often with little or no presence by the formal state.
The potential for armed conflict emanating from informally governed
regions always exists, but local elites make the rational decision that
tolerating that risk—and living with persistent terrorism—makes more
sense than attempting to exercise full control everywhere.
The traditional notion of counterinsurgency called on the state
to undertake economic development to undercut resentment and
opposition. In other words, the state would provide a better deal to
the population than the insurgents. This idea made sense within the
context of modernization theory as American’s first grappled with
counterinsurgency. It was no coincidence Walt Rostow—the deputy
national security adviser for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson,
as well as an architect of US involvement in Vietnam—had written a
book linking the “stages” of economic growth with political stability.31
Positing a causal relationship between economic growth and
preventing or quelling insurgency has many problems though. One is
the tendency of populations to grow faster than the creation of jobs.
Many analysts have found a correlation between youth bulges and
youth un- (or under-) employment as well as internal political violence.32
Even states that recognize this interdependence often can do little
about it, particularly in an era of globalization, when the economic
health of a nation is often determined by external factors beyond its
control.33 And, the causal linkage between economic growth and
insurgency oversimplifies the causes for someone creating or joining
an insurgency. Often psychological factors such as personal grievances
or the desire for personal empowerment, heroic status, or simple
31      Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
32      See Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts,” Council on Foreign
Relations, April 13, 2007, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts;
Henrik Urdal, The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950–
2000, Social Development Paper 14 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); and Office of Conflict
Management and Mitigation, Youth Bulges and Conflict, Technical Brief Winter 2010 (Washington, DC:
US Agency for International Development).
33      Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
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boredom are as, or more, important than political factors or the absence
of economic opportunity.34 Simply creating low status jobs does not
address these psychological factors.
Today changes in the global security environment exacerbate
the flawed assumptions and the internal tensions of the traditional
conceptualization of counterinsurgency and undercut much of its
remaining validity. Take the notion that counterinsurgency requires the
state to create a counternarrative to the one propagated by insurgents.
The counterinsurgency narrative, according to Joint doctrine,
should contextualize what the population experiences, legitimizing
counterinsurgent actions and delegitimizing the insurgency. It is an
interpretive lens designed to help individuals and groups make decisions
in the face of uncertainty where the stakes are perceived as life and
death. The [counterinsurgency] narrative should explain the current
situation and describe how the [host nation] government will defeat the
insurgency. It should invoke relevant cultural and historical references to
both justify the actions of counterinsurgents and make the case that the
government will win.35

Creating a coherent narrative was feasible in the twentiethcentury when the primary means of information propagation other
than interpersonal communication—authoritative written material or
broadcasts—could be controlled, or at least largely controlled, by the
state. In today’s information saturated environment where narratives
can form, grow, go dormant, and be reborn outside the control of the
state, the idea of counterinsurgents agreeing to and implementing a
narrative to influence perceptions of a conflict, as US counterinsurgency
doctrine calls for, is nostalgic at best.36 With radical transparency and
instant connectivity, there is more of a theme and meme swarm than the
development and promulgation of an agreed-upon, coherent narrative.
State sponsorship of insurgency or provision of sanctuary to
insurgents still happens as it did during the Cold War. Think Russia
and Ukraine, Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Iran and Yemen. For the
United States, though, there is no risk of the “death of a thousand small
cuts” as during the Cold War. Insurgency is still using proxy aggression
but is no longer a form of superpower proxy conflict. In general terms,
this application means insurgency is less strategically significant than
it once was.

Where Do We Go Now?

Today insurgency is most common precisely where the flawed
assumptions, conundrums, and internal tensions of the traditional notion
of counterinsurgency are the most pervasive. And, the United States
security policy has entered a time of frugality. America can no longer
lavish security resources with little regard for efficiency. This need for
frugality means counterinsurgency has run its course. With the strategic
34      Steven Metz, “Psychology of Participation in Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, January 27,
2012, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/psychology-of-participation-in-insurgency.
35      JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-9.
36      For an exploration of this concept, see Steven Metz, “The Internet, New Media, and
the Evolution of Insurgency,” Parameters 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 80–90. For a more expansive
treatment of the broader phenomenon, see James Jay Carafano, Wiki at War: Conflict in a Socially
Networked World (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2012).
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stakes lower, it no longer makes sense for the United States to accept the
gross inefficiency and adverse benefit-cost ratio of counterinsurgency.
America must still counter irregular threats but improve efficiency and
better balance costs and benefits.
The first step is remembering the United States reengaged in
counterinsurgency after the September 11 attacks because policymakers
saw it as part of antiterrorism. Such actions were a way to eliminate
sanctuaries for extremist movements and shrink the pool of terrorist
recruits. But in reality, counterinsurgency support almost never
reaches that end state. Partner governments take American support
and implement enough reforms that the insurgency cannot overthrow
them; then, the partners stop. They tolerate simmering extremism in
the hinterlands or urban slums so long as it does not pose an existential
threat to the regime.
This practice means counterinsurgency may be an effective method
of antiterrorism; however, it is not an efficient one. Today the United
States needs antiterrorism strategies that are acceptably effective but also
affordable and sustainable. To find them, policymakers must remember
the threat of nations ruled by extremists providing bases for terrorists
to attack the United States or its allies. Thus, helping create friendly
governments that rule the way the United States would prefer might be
nice. But, the only necessity is preventing terrorist power projection.
Given that, the United States should shift to something such as
the Israeli approach to extremism and terrorism. After finding out
how difficult and costly traditional pacification and counterinsurgency
is and recognizing it could never “win the hearts and minds” of the
Arab populations in places like southern Lebanon, Gaza, and the West
Bank, Israel concluded it could tolerate extremism but not terrorism,
settling for a realistic, affordable, and sustainable approach that is not
contingent on how neighboring states are ruled. If enemies mobilize
enough strength to threaten Israel directly, it strikes at them with the
most effective combination of air and land based military power. After
weakening the extremists, Israel withdraws, knowing it may have to
repeat offensive operations again if the threat reaches intolerable levels.
This approach, which relies on the time-tested techniques of spoiling
raids and large-scale but limited duration punitive expeditions, might
provide an acceptably effective and sustainable post-counterinsurgency
strategy for the United States.37 Such an avenue clearly would require
some sort of small persistent presence using some combination of the
intelligence community, military special operations forces, overhead
assets (most unmanned), and increasingly, ground-based autonomous
systems. But if al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, or another terrorism-based
extremist movement develops bases and a power projection capability
in a place like Afghanistan, Libya, or Yemen, the United States should
launch a powerful military and interagency strike force. But America
should abandon the idea that the Afghanistans, Yemens, and Libyas of
the world want to, or can become, stable, pro-American nations, or that
trying to transform them is a good use of increasingly scarce security
37      For more on this approach, see Steven Metz, “The Case for a Punitive Expedition against
the Islamic State,” World Politics Review, February 6, 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com
/articles/15031/the-case-for-a-punitive-expedition-against-the-islamic-state.
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resources. So long as transnational terrorists do not plot, train for, and
launch attacks from such nation’s soil, that is enough.
To make this approach work, the US military needs to redesign
its forces and develop strategic concepts and doctrine for limited
duration, large-scale expeditions. The key would be the ability to
project Joint and interagency forces—increasingly ones bolstered by
autonomous systems—over long distances, and repeat as necessary. The
mantra for counterinsurgency has always been “clear, hold, build.” An
expeditionary antiterrorism strategy would accept clearing is necessary,
but holding and building are not worth the costs. Adversaries would
no longer believe they could draw the US military in and wear down
American will over time. Hopefully, opposing forces would be deterred
by knowing the United States could at least “clear” through large-scale
expeditions as many times as necessary, particularly as expeditionary
forces increasingly integrate autonomous systems. Deterrence always
requires capability, credibility, and communications. An antiterrorism
strategy based on limited duration expeditions would be credible in a
way traditional counterinsurgency is not.

Conclusion

Traditional counterinsurgency was seen as a form of war without
all the definitional attributes of war but with a dose of an oldfashioned theory of modernization, which has been superseded in
the academic world. If the concept ever made sense, it no longer does.
Counterinsurgency must be refocused on the core security problem:
transnational terrorism. Counterinsurgency might be a way to address
that problem, but it is immensely inefficient and difficult to sustain
politically. When the United States had a surplus of defense resources
and could garner public support for anything that struck back at
extremism in the emotional years immediately after the September 11
attacks, inefficiency was tolerable. Now, it no longer is.
This turn of events suggests the United States must abandon
counterinsurgency as a tool of antiterrorism. Shifting to a strategy
that contains, weakens, and deters transnational terrorism by strategic
expeditions—large scale punitive raids, repeated if necessary—is a
viable way of meeting the criteria of minimal effectiveness, maximum
efficiency, and political sustainability.

